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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Federal Income Taxation-Deferral of Prepaid Income
In American Auto Ass'n v. United States,' the United States
Supreme Court held that a taxpayer on the accrual basis may not
defer prepaid membership dues over the period of membership, but
must include such receipts as income in the year of receipt. The
Association received membership dues for a twelve month period,
payable in advance. Membership commenced or might be renewed
in any month of the year. For many years, the Association had
employed an accrual method of accounting and the calendar year as
its taxable year.' The dues were treated on the Associations' books
of account as income received ratably over the twelve month mem-
bership period. In the year of receipt the Association reported as
income only that portion of the dues applicable to the calendar year
during which the dues were collected. The balance was recognized
as income in the ensuing calendar year.3
The Commissioner, acting pursuant to section 41 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939,' rejected the Associations' method of account-
ing and substituted a method of his own. He claimed that the Asso-
ciations' method did not properly reflect its income for tax purposes.
Section 41 required a taxpayer to compute his income on an annual
basis in accordance with the method of accounting which he regu-
larly employed, but provided that if no method was regularly used,
or if the method used did not clearly reflect income, the computation
would be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of
the Commissioner clearly reflected his income. Section 42 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939' required all items of income to be
included in the gross income for the taxable year in which they were
received by the taxpayer, unless, under section 41, they were to be
properly accounted for as of a different period.
When sections 41 and 42 are read together, it seems clear that
1367 U.S. 687 (1961).
'The Association had used the accrual method since 1932.
During the years of 1952 and 1953, the Association reported as income
one-twelfth of the dues received for each month of membership occurring
in the year of receipt.
'53 Stat. 24 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446).
'53 Stat. 24 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 451).
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the Commissioner is given no discretion to reject a taxpayer's regu-
larly employed accounting method so long as it clearly reflects his
income. Therefore, the critical question to be determined in a case
such as the present one is whether the taxpayer's method clearly
reflects income. But in the principal case the Court seems to have
brushed aside this question and proceeded to decide when the income
in question should be reported for tax purposes without regard to the
taxpayer's accounting system or accepted accounting practice.
In disallowing the deferral of income, the Commissioner has tra-
ditionally taken the position that such a method is in conflict with
the "claim of right" doctrine. This doctrine was first announced
in North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet.6 The Court in that case
said,
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and
without restriction as to its disposition, he has received in-
come which he is required to return, even though it may still
be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and
even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent.
The cases relying on this doctrine, with the exception of Automobile
Club of Michigan v, Commissioner,7 have dealt with earned rather
than unearned income, and the only question was when this earned
income should be reported for tax purposes.' The case announcing
the doctrine had nothing to do with the determination of whether a
method of accounting was valid or invalid and it should have no
weight in deciding a case of the present type.
Four circuits have held that the claim of right doctrine may not
be used to compel a taxpayer to report unearned income in the year
of receipt. The tenth circuit held, in Beacon Publishing Co. v. Com-
missioner,' that a magazine publisher could defer prepaid subscrip-
tion income over the duration of the subscription period. In 1956
8286 U.S. 417 (1932).
7353 U.S. 180 (1957).
In the case announcing the claim of right doctrine, there was no dispute
but that the income was already earned. No case was found, except Auto-
mobile Club of Michigan, in which the Supreme Court relied on the doctrine
to reject a taxpayer's method of accounting, and it is not clear that it was
relied on in that case.
'218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 455, now
provides that publishers may defer prepaid subscription income when the
subscription period extends beyond the taxable year of receipt.
[Vol. 40
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the fifth circuit had occasion to decide whether prepaid income from
contracts to service heating furnaces sold by the taxpayer must be
reported in the year of receipt. That court found, in Schuessler v.
Commissioner,0 that the accrual method of accounting more accu-
rately portrayed the taxpayer's income than the one selected by the
Commissioner because it matched income against expenses of the
period in which the income was earned and was incident to earning
that income, rather than against expenses of the period in which the
income was received and without regard to when'the income was
earned. More recently, the second circuit held, in Bressner Radio,
Inc. v. Commissioner," that prepaid income from television servicing
contracts could be deferred over the length of the obligation to fur-
nish service. In 1960 the eighth circuit, in Schlude v. Commis-
sioner,"2 held that a taxpayer who operated a dancing school could
defer prepaid tuition over the period of instruction covered by the
contract where the obligation to furnish instruction extended beyond
the taxable year of receipt. In upholding the taxpayers deferral, all
four circuits noted that the taxpayer was deferring unearned income
until a period in which it could be matched with expenses incurred
incident to earning the income.' 3 Since this is the objective to be
achieved by any sound accrual accounting system, it seems that these
courts were on sound footing.
In the present case the government had successfully relied upon
the claim of right doctrine in the Court of Claims." Upon appeal
to the Supreme Court, the government switched its argument to
the annual accounting requirement found in section 41 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.15
10 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
11267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).12283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 911 (1961).
The reversal was based upon the decision in the principal case." The Association had a more difficult task in proving its system of
accounting properly matched future expenses with deferred income than did
the taxpayers in these cases. Substantially all services provided by the
Association were performed only on demand and were not limited to any
fixed dates, but were performed at any time requested by its members.
", 181 F. Supp. 255 (Ct. Cl. 1960). The government did not rely on the
claim of right doctrine probably because four circuits had previously denied
that such ground may be used as a basis to deny a taxpayer the right to defer
prepayments. The Second, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeal had previously held that the claim of right doctrine had no applica-
tion in determining when to report prepaid unearned income, and allowed
accrual basis taxpayers to defer unearned income in accordance with their
regularly employed method of accounting.
1 53 Stat. 24 (now INT. Rav. CoDn oF 1954, § 446).
19621
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The annual accounting requirement demands that neither income
nor deduction items be accelerated or postponed from one year to
another in order to reflect the long-term economic result of a par-
ticular transaction or group of transactions. However, as noted
by the dissent, most of the cases relied upon by the government as
a basis for this argument, involved cash basis taxpayers and none
of the decisions cited pertain to deferred reporting of wholly un-
earned income.' 6 Apparently this interpretation of the annual
accounting requirement stems from a rule laid down by the Tax
Court in Automobile Club of New York"7 to the effect that, "an item
of income cannot accrue for tax purposes after it has in fact been
received subject to the unrestricted use by the taxpayer."
The Supreme Court in the principal case did not base its decision
solely upon the annual accounting requirement. It seems to have
placed considerable weight on the fact that the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as originally passed, contained specific provisions
allowing taxpayers to defer unearned, prepaid income to a tax period
later than that of receipt,' and to accrue expenses and deduct them
in the period during which they actually became due."" The Supreme
Court said that section 452 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
was not merely a statement of prior existing law, but that it was the
first specific acceptance of the deferral of prepaid, unearned income
for tax purposes. It further said that this provision was contrary to
existing law, and that its repeal was an indication that Congress
intended to restore the law to its status prior to the enactment of
this section and not to allow this type deferral. As the income in
question was for 1952 and 1953, it seems that action taken by Con-
gress in 1954 and 1955 should have no bearing on the decision in
the present case. The Court did not mention section 446 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which specifically recognizes the
accrual method of accounting as acceptable for computing income
for tax purposes.
16 In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), the Court
took note that the taxpayer had not attempted to take advantage of the ac-
crual method under which system the treatment in question would have been
allowed. In Security Mills Flour Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944),
the taxpayer had not applied consistently either a cash or accrual method;
Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934), involved an attempt by an accrual
basis taxpayer to accrue an expense that was highly contingent.
1732 T.C. 906, 913 (1959). (Emphasis is by the court.)
I TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 452, 68A Stat. 152.
19 INT. RFv. CODE F 1954, ch. 1, § 462, 68A Stat. 158.
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The Supreme Court also placed some reliance on Automobile
Club of Michigan. In that case the sixth circuit relied on the claim
of right doctrine in affirming the Commissioner's disallowance of
the taxpayer's deferral of prepaid membership dues. The Supreme
Court did not specifically rely on the doctrine, but said, in affirming
the circuit court in that case, that the taxpayer's method of account-
ing was "purely artificial" so far as the record before the Court
showed. Apparently this was because there was no proof that the
Automobile Club's method of accounting properly matched income
with the expenses incurred which were incident to the earning of the
income. This would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court would
be willing to allow a taxpayer to defer income if he could show that
his method of accounting clearly reflected income. In the instant
case, there was expert accounting testimony that supported the Ass(?-
ciation's method, and the hearing commissioner found that the tax-
payer's method clearly reflected income,20 yet the Supreme Court
still refused to allow the deferral.
The courts have been, until recently, more favorable to the ac-
crual basis taxpayer who accrued expenses and deducted them in
a period prior to the tax period in which they were actually paid.
This situation is analogous to the deferral of unearned income and
it was also controlled by section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. An early case in which the Supreme Court considered this
problem is United States v. Anderson.21 That case involved an
accrual basis taxpayer who attempted to deduct munitions taxes in
the taxable period during which they actually were assesed and be-
came due. The basis of the tax was sales made by the taxpayer in
the previous tax period. The Court held that the taxes accrued as
the sales were made and could not be deducted in the following
period because the true income could not have been determined
without deducting from gross income for the year the total cost and
expenses attributable to the production of that income during the
year. In construing sections 12(a) and 13(d) of the Revenue Act
of 1916,2 which were similar to section 41 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, the Court said of the purpose of the act,
It was to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their
returns according to scientific accounting principles, by charg-
2 American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 693 n.5 (1961).
21269 U.S. 422 (1926).
" REv. Acr OF 1916, ch. 463, §§ 12(a) & 13(d), 39 Stat. 767, 771.
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ing against income earned during the taxable period, the
expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process
of earning income during that period; and indeed, to require
the tax return to be made on that basis, if the taxpayer failed
or was unable to make the return on a strict receipts and dis-
bursements basis.
The appellee's true income for 1916 could not have been
determined without deducting from its gross income for the
year the total cost and expenses attributable to the production
of that income during the year.23
The Court there held that the tax must be deducted in 1916 or not
at all. It said that this was true regardless of the fact that the tax
was assessed and paid in 1917, since it was based on sales made in
1916, and that it made no difference that the taxpayer did not know
until the assessment the amount of the munitions tax.
If a taxpayer's books are to clearly reflect his income, as required
by section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, he must record
and report his expenses and income according to the same method
of accounting. Therefore, if a taxpayer is required to deduct ex-
penses only in the year of accrual, it seems that he should be re-
quired to recognize his income only in the year during which it is
earned. But the Supreme Court seems to have a double standard in
requiring an expense to be accrued and deducted regardless of
whether it has been paid, and at the same time refusing to allow a
deferral of prepaid income. It follows that a taxpayer may be re-
quired to keep two different sets of books, one for income tax pur-
poses, and another for reporting to stockholders and governmental
agencies. The Tax Court in National Airlines, Inc.24 recognized
that the requirement of keeping two different sets of books may
constitute a hardship on the taxpayer, but that court said the remedy
was not to be furnished by the judiciary.
Congress has in effect overruled the decision in the present case
as applied to certain membership organizations which are organized
without capital stock. In 1961 Congress passed a statute25 which
allows qualified organizations to spread prepaid membership dues
income ratably over the period during which there is a liability to
-2269 U.S. at 440.
fl9 T.C. 159, 162 (1947).2 IxNT. REv. CODE op 1954, § 456.
[Vol. 40
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perform services. The period of such liability must extend beyond
the year of receipt, but must not be in excess of three years. Those
taxpayers who cannot qualify under this statute may still be able to
defer reporting of prepaid unearned income by proving that there is
a reasonable correlation between the income deferred and future
expenses. Such a conclusion seems to be justified as the Supreme
Court in the principal case placed considerable reliance upon the
Automobile Club of Michigan case.
RoBERT L. GuNN
Pleadings-Cross-Claim for Contribution
In Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs., Inc.,' plaintiff sued to re-
cover damages for personal injuries, joining A and B as alleged
joint tort-feasors. A filed a cross-claim against B setting up a plea
for contribution. B moved to strike the cross-claim. The trial court
allowed the motion. On appeal this was affirmed in a four to three
decision.'
The most obvious and severe consequence of this decision is to
preclude an original defendant in such an action from holding another
original defendant in to defend against his contribution claim should
plaintiff take a voluntary or suffer an involuntary nonsuit against him
at any time prior to judgment.' It thereby adds yet another com-
plexity to an already intricate and still evolving pattern of rules in our
multiple party pleading practice.4
1254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).
Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Win-
borne, Justices Denny and Higgins concurred. Justice Bobbitt dissented,
joined by Justices Parker and Rodman. Subsequently, in Bass v. Lee, 255
N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (1961), the court reaffirmed this position with only
Justice Bobbitt dissenting.
'This consequence was frankly recognized by the majority opinion which
stated the question presented and answer in this form: "In an action against
two defendants, as joint tort-feasors, may one defendant set up a plea for
contribution against the co-defendant and thereby preclude dismissal of the
co-defendant during the trial and before judgment.... The answer is 'No."
254 N.C. at 691, 120 S.E.2d at 90.
' See Brandis & Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive
Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REv. 405, 419-22,
425-29 (1956); BRAiNDIs, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina of the
Federal Joinder Rules, 25 N.C.L. REv. 245, 260-68 (1947); BRANDIS, Per-
missive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. REv. 1
(1946). In these articles the authors review the decisions of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in an effort to formulate the rules regarding mul-
tiple party pleading. From the cases discussed therein and more recent de-
cisions of the court, the rules pertaining to cross-claim for contribution prior
to Greene appear to be as follows: (a) Prior to the enactment of G.S. § 1-240
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